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PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW
The original plaintiff in the proceedings below was the Utah State Bar Office of
Professional Conduct. The defendant was John Alex. Pursuant to an Order dated
December 20, 2001, the trial court appointed Loren Weiss as trustee of the estate of John
Alex. Subsequent pleadings filed in the district court by Appellant identify Appellant
Felt Building as an "intervenor" in such proceedings.
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JURISDICTION
Appellant has set forth the incorrect jurisdictional standard. See Brief of
Appellant, p. 1. This matter is before the Utah Supreme Court, rather than the Utah Court
of Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), as
this matter is on appeal from an order of the Third District Court over which the Court of
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)
(identifying matters over which Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARDS OF REVIEW,
AND PRESERVATION BELOW
Appellant has failed to comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in its
"Statement of the Issues Presented for Review." Rule 24(a)(5) requires that Appellant
include: "(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court;
or (B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial
court.'5 Neither is present in Appellant's "Statement of the Issues Presented for Review."
See Brief of Appellant, p. 1. In addition, as set forth below, Appellant cites the wrong
standard of review on the sole issue before the Court, to wit, the review of a denial of a
motion for reconsideration. Id.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The following statutory provisions are at issue in this appeal:
1.
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10.5, which states in relevant part:

(1) Each order of restitution shall:
(a) direct the defendant to vacate the premises, remove his personal
property, and restore possession of the premises to the plaintiff, or be
forcibly removed by a sheriff or constable;
(3) (a) If the defendant fails to comply with the order within the time
prescribed by the court, a sheriff or constable at the plaintiffs direction may
enter the premises by force using the least destructive means possible to
remove the defendant.
(b) Any personal property of the defendant may be removed from the
premises by the sheriff or constable and transported to a suitable location
for safe storage. The sheriff or constable may delegate responsibility for
storage to the plaintiff, who shall store the personal property in a suitable
place and in a reasonable manner.
(c) The personal property removed and stored shall be inventoried by
the sheriff or constable or the plaintiff who shall keep the original inventory
and personally deliver or mail the defendant a copy of the inventory
immediately after the personal property is removed.
(4) (a) After demand made by the defendant within 30 days of removal of
personal property from the premises, the sheriff or constable or the plaintiff
shall promptly return all of the defendant's personal property upon payment
of the reasonable costs incurred for its removal and storage.
(b) The person storing the personal property may sell the property
remaining in storage at a public sale if:
(i) the defendant does not request a hearing or demand return of the
personal property within 30 days of its removal from the premises;
or
(ii) the defendant fails to pay the reasonable costs incurred for the
removal and storage of the personal property.

(f) If the property belonging to a person who is not a defendant is
removed and stored in accordance with this section, that person may claim
the property by delivering a written demand for its release to the sheriff or
constable or the plaintiff. If the claimant provides proper identification and
evidence of ownership, the sheriff or constable or the plaintiff shall
promptly release the property at no cost to the claimant.
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2.

Rule 27(a), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability:

Protective appointment of trustee. If a lawyer has diappeared or died, or if
a respondent has been suspended or disbarred or transferred to disability
status, and if there is evidence that the lawyer or respondent has not
complied with the provisions of Rule 26 and no partner, executor or other
responsible party capable of conducting the lawyer's or respondent's affairs
is known to exist, a district judge of the judicial district in which the lawyer
or respondent maintained a principal office, upon the request of OPC
counsel, may appoint a trustee to inventory the lawyer's or respondent's
files, notify the lawyer's or respondent's clients, distribute the files to the
clients, return unearned fees and other funds, and take any additional action
authorized by the judge making the appointment.
3.

Rule 23A, Utah R. App. P.:

An appeal dismissed for failure to take a step other than the timely filing of
a notice of appeal may be reinstated by the court upon motion of the
appellant for (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect or (b)
fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct of an adverse party. The motion
shall be made within a reasonable time after entry of the order of dismissal.
4.

Rule 37(b), Utah R. App. P.:

b) Voluntary dismissal. If the parties to an appeal or other proceeding sign
and file with the clerk an agreement that the proceeding be dismissed,
specifying the terms as to payment of costs and pay whatever fees are due,
the clerk shall enter an order of dismissal. Absent such agreement, an
appeal may be dismissed on motion of the appellant upon such terms as to
payment of costs and fees as the court may order. If appellant has the right
to effective assistance of counsel, the appeal may be dismissed only if
appellant's motion is accompanied by appellant's personal affidavit
demonstrating that appellant's decision to dismiss the appeal is voluntary
and made with knowledge of the right to an appeal and an understanding of
the consequences of voluntary dismissal.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
Appellant has adequately stated the nature of the case in its "Statement of the
Case" section, see Brief of Appellant, pp. 1-4, except for one provision. Appellant states
that "On April 1, 2002, under threat of contempt, appellant agreed to surrender
possession of the entire contents Mr. Alex' former law office to the Utah State Bar
Trustee pending hearing on appellant's motion for reconsideration of the March 22,
2002 order." See Brief of Appellant, p. 4 (emphasis added). This italicized statement is
incorrect, as there was no motion for reconsideration pending at that time, and no such
caveat is set forth in the trial court's minute entry reflecting the parties' stipulation. See
Appellate Record, p. 502.
Further, Appellant neither cites to the record (other than counsel's own argument
to the trial court on Appellant's motion for reconsideration), nor attaches any of the
relevant documents in the form of an Appendix. Where, appropriate, Appellee has set
forth certain relevant documents in its Appendix hereto.
B. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review
After the events set forth in the Brief of Appellant, pp. 1-4, Appellant filed an
untimely Notice of Appeal (filed July 18, 2002) and Docketing Statement (dated August
7, 2002). Appellant then filed a document entitled "Withdrawal of Appeal and Request
for Return of Appeal Bond" on August 16, 2002. A copy of this document is attached
hereto as Addendum Exhibit "A." A Notice of Decision and accompanying Order was
issued by this Court on August 23, 2002, dismissing this appeal pursuant to Rule 37(b),
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Utah R. Civ. P. A copy of the Notice and Decision is attached hereto as Addendum
Exhibit "B."
On August 27, 2002, counsel for Appellant filed another document entitled
"Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and Reinstate Appeal and Affidavit of
Counsel." A copy of this document is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit "C."
However, counsel did not wait for this Court to rule on this motion. Instead, she simply
submitted an "Amended Docketing Statement", filed August 22, 2002 {one week before
her motion was even filed, and one day before the appeal was dismissed). A copy of the
Amended Docketing Statement is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit "D." In addition,
counsel for Appellant filed an "Amended Notice of Appeal", dated August 19, 2002.
This was apparently filed in the district court on August 19, 2002 (once again, before the
appeal was dismissed), and twice with this Court - once on August 19, 2002, and again
on August 28, 2002. A copy of each Amended Notice of Appeal is attached hereto
collectively as Addendum Exhibit "E." The Amended Docketing Statement and
Amended Notice of Appeal received a new (handwritten) case number. However, it was
the same appeal that had already been dismissed by this Court. Moreover, no new
docketing statement was filed by Appellant.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant's appeal should be dismissed upon procedural and substantive grounds.
First, Appellant cites the incorrect standard of review for the one and only issue before
this Court: did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant's motion to
reconsider the March 22, 2002 Order? The correct standard is an "abuse of discretion"
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standard, which Appellant cannot meet because, among other things, there is an
insufficient record to make this determination.
Second, Appellant's substantive arguments fail because Appellant relies on the
wrong statute, and on a misconception of "property rights" which simply do not apply in
this case. Appellee was entitled to the personal property of Mr. Alex based upon the
orders issued by the trial court. Appellant's arguments that the trial court did not have
the authority to grant such orders are to date unexplained and without merit.
Finally, Appellant has run awry of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in many
respects, and its appeal should be dismissed on these grounds, as well.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANT CITES INCORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW AND
NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION HAS BEEN SHOWN.

Appellant cites the incorrect standard of review for this case. Appellant states
that, "[t]he District Court's ruling on appellant's motion for reconsideration is a matter of
law. Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and are given no special deference
on appeal." See Brief of Appellant, p. 1. This misstates the standard of review of the
only issue on appeal, to wit, whether the trial court erred when it denied Appellant's
motion for reconsideration.
Utah courts have consistently held that, '"[a] motion or action to modify a final
judgment is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, the exercise of which must be
based on sound legal principles in light of all relevant circumstances.' That court's
determination will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion." Gillmor v.
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Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434 (Utah 1993) quoting Laub v. South Central Utah Tel. Ass'n,
657 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982). See also Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d
1306, 1312 (Utah App. 1994) ("it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to grant
a motion under Rule 54(b), and the decision to do so will not be disturbed on appeal
absent an abuse of this discretion"), citing State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 882 n.4 (Utah
App. 1989); Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah 1996) ("A trial courts
decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider summary judgment is within the
discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb its ruling absent an abuse of
discretion.")
Appellant not only cites the incorrect standard, but the cases that are cited at p. 1
of the Brief of Appellant are wholly inapposite. State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah
1996) and State v. Navarick, 987 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1999), are state criminal law cases, and
Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994), was a divorce case; none of
these cases involved the standard of review for motions for reconsideration.
Aside from citing the incorrect standard, Appellant has failed to gather sufficient
evidence to show that the trial court abused its discretion denying Appellant's motion for
reconsideration. This is particularly true since the transcript of the hearing on that motion
is incomplete. It only contains a portion of Appellant's counsel's argument, and omits
any argument from counsel for Appellee, and - more importantly - any discussion from
the trial court itself. As set forth by this Court in Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 17 P.3d 1110,
1115 (Utah 2000):
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As an appellate court, our 'power of review is strictly limited to the record
presented on appeal.5 Van Cott v. Wall, 53 Utah 282, 296, 178 P. 42, 48
(1918) (on application for rehearing). 'Parties claiming error below and
seeking appellate review have the duty and responsibility to support
their allegations with an adequate record.' State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64,
67 (Utah 1993); see also Utah R. App. P. 1 l(e)(l)-(2). The record in this
case contains only partial transcripts. As such, where we are without
an adequate record, we must assume the regularity of the proceedings
below. See Wetzel, 868 P.2d at 67.
(Emphasis added.)
The partial transcript provided by Appellant is simply insufficient to find an abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court, and Appellant provides no other evidence of
record to enable this Court to make this determination. Therefore, the decision of the
trial court should be affirmed and this appeal should be dismissed.
II.

APPELLANT'S SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS FAIL.
A.

Counsel for Appellant Stipulated to the Acts Now
Complained Of.

Even from the limited record that is available, it is apparent that counsel for
Appellant stipulated to the terms of the March 22, 2002 Order. See, e.g., Appellant's
Motion for Reconsideration, attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit U F", p. 6 ("On April 1,
2002,1 stipulated that to possession [sic] of the property because the March 22, order has
not been set aside and because my clients were with contempt if they refused."); see also
Appellate Record, p. 502 (trial court minutes, stating "On record a stipulation of the
parties is reached on the OSC, as read into the record by [counsel for Appellee], resolving
the issues."). Therefore, Appellant's argument regarding the Court's refusal to reconsider
that very order has no merit.
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B.

Appellant's Argument Regarding Rule 27, Rules of Lawyer
Discipline and Disability, Was Not Raised Below, and is
Incorrect.

Appellant urges that Rule 27, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability,
precludes the invalidates the trial court's March 22, 2002 Order. Appellee is unable to
find where Appellant made this argument to the trial court below. See, e.g., Motion for
Reconsideration Modify or Set Aside Order, Addendum Exhibit "F." Moreover,
Appellant has not cited in its "Statement of the Issues Presented for Review" where in the
record it made this argument. See Brief of Appellant, p. 1. Appellant should not be
allowed to raise this issue for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Coleman v. Stevens, 17
P.3d 1122 (Utah 2000).
In any event, Appellant ignores the plain language of Rule 27, which states that a
"district judge.. .may appoint a trustee to.. .return unearned fees and other funds, and take
any additional action authorized by the judge making the appointment." Rule 27(a),
Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability (emphasis added). This is precisely what
occurred here. The trial court issued an Order on December 20, 2001, disbarring Mr.
Alex, appointing Mr. Weiss as trustee, and granting Mr. Weiss those powers enumerated
in Rule 27 and "any and other powers reasonably necessary to fulfill the obligations of
the trustee..." See December 20, 2001 Order, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Addendum Exhibit "G." On March 22, 2002, the trial court issued a second order,
clarifying the December 20, 2001 Order, specifically granting Mr. Weiss, as trustee, the
authority to "recover, attach, remove and possess any and all property, including but not
limited to all files, records, electronic data, computers, furnishings, office equipment and
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machines, telephones, chairs, refrigerators at the former law office(s) and residence(s) of
the respondent, John Alex." See March 22, 2002 Order, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum Exhibit "H." Appellee has provided no authority or reason why
these Orders are improper under Rule 27 (let alone an "unconstitutional taking"). As
such, there is no basis to overturn the trial court's refusal to reconsider or set aside the
March 22, 2002 Order.
C.

Appellant's Argument Regarding "A Lessor In Possession Of
Abandoned Property" Has No Application and Applies
Incorrect Statute.

Appellant cites at once a variety of Utah statutes and legal concepts, hoping that
one of these references will entitle Appellant to a ruling that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Appellant's motion to reconsider. Appellant cites to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-36-12.6, makes a reference to a statutory "lessor's lien", and cites to a lease
agreement, see Brief of Appellant, p. 8, but fails to show why any of these references
entitle Appellant to the relief requested.
First, Appellant cites the wrong statute. As set forth by Appellant in its Brief,
Appellant obtained a default judgment and order of restitution of the premises where Mr.
Alex had his place of business. Therefore, the applicable statute is not Utah Code Ann. §
78-36-12.6, the abandonment statute, but is instead Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10.5,
entitled "Order of Restitution-Service-Enforcement-Disposition of Personal PropertyHearing." This statute states, in relevant part:
(1) Each order of restitution shall:
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(a) direct the defendant to vacate the premises, remove his personal
property, and restore possession of the premises to the plaintiff, or be
forcibly removed by a sheriff or constable;
(3) (a) If the defendant fails to comply with the order within the time
prescribed by the court, a sheriff or constable at the plaintiffs direction may
enter the premises by force using the least destructive means possible to
remove the defendant.
(b) Any personal property of the defendant may be removed from the
premises by the sheriff or constable and transported to a suitable location
for safe storage. The sheriff or constable may delegate responsibility for
storage to the plaintiff, who shall store the personal property in a suitable
place and in a reasonable manner.
(c) The personal property removed and stored shall be inventoried by
the sheriff or constable or the plaintiff who shall keep the original inventory
and personally deliver or mail the defendant a copy of the inventory
immediately after the personal property is removed.
(4) (a) After demand made by the defendant within 30 days of removal of
personal property from the premises, the sheriff or constable or the plaintiff
shall promptly return all of the defendant's personal property upon payment
of the reasonable costs incurred for its removal and storage.
(b) The person storing the personal property may sell the property
remaining in storage at a public sale if:
(i) the defendant does not request a hearing or demand return of the
personal property within 30 days of its removal from the premises;
or
(ii) the defendant fails to pay the reasonable costs incurred for the
removal and storage of the personal property.
(f) If the property belonging to a person who is not a defendant is
removed and stored in accordance with this section, that person may
claim the property by delivering a written demand for its release to the
sheriff or constable or the plaintiff. If the claimant provides proper
identification and evidence of ownership, the sheriff or constable or the
plaintiff shall promptly release the property at no cost to the claimant.
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10.5(1), -(3), -(4) (emphasis added). Appellant has made no
showing that it performed any of the required obligations set out in this statute.
Regardless, under the December 20, 2001 and March 22, 2002 Orders of the trial court,
the personal property at issue belonged to Mr. Weiss, as trustee, and Appellant was
obligated under Utah Code Ann. 78-36-10.5(4) to turn over such property to Mr. Weiss.
As such, Appellant has failed to show that there was an abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court.
Finally, although Appellant makes reference to a "lessor's lien", it fails to make
any argument in regard to such alleged lien, when it existed, terminated, or whether it
was ever perfected. See Brief of Appellant, p. 8. There is no proof whatsoever that
Appellant took all - or any - steps to perfect a lessor's lien as required by Utah Code
Ann. § 38-3-1 through - 8 . Therefore, to the extent Appellant makes an argument in
regard to interests it may have had under a "lessor's lien", Appellant has once again
failed to meet its burden to show that the trial court abused its discretion.
D.

Appellant's "Notice" Argument is Without Merit.

Appellant argues that its motion to reconsider should have been granted, because
the March 22, 2002 Order was not issued with due regard for the property rights of
Appellant - a commercial landlord who was not a party to and had no stake in the
original disbarment proceedings. Appellant alleges it was entitled to such notice because
"Section 78-36-12.6, subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b)(ii) of the Utah Annotated Code (as
amended), vest appellant, as lessor, with property rights in the personal property
abandoned by John Alex..." See Brief of Appellant, p. 10. Although this statement does
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not appear to be correct under the plain language of § 78-36-12.6, it is irrelevant,
because, as set forth above, Appellant cites the incorrect statute. The applicable
provision is Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10.5, which requires certain procedures of
Appellant in regard to a tenant's personal property (which were not performed), and
which specifically provides: "If the property belonging to a person who is not a defendant
is removed and stored in accordance with this section, that person may claim the property
by delivering a written demand for its release to the sheriff or constable or the plaintiff."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10.5(4)(f).
Per the Orders of the trial court dated December 20, 2001 and March 22, 2002, all
of the belonging's in Mr. Alex's office were the property of Mr. Weiss as trustee. There
is nothing in any Order or Judgment obtained by the Appellant which states to the
contrary. Therefore, Appellant's argument that no notice was given to Appellant in
regard to the March 22, 2002 Order is without merit.
In any event, as set forth above, Appellant appeared twice through counsel before
the trial court to discuss the March 22, 2002 Order. As set forth in the Brief of Appellant,
p. 3, Appellant was served with an Order to Show Cause on March 29, 2002, and counsel
for Appellant appeared before the trial court, only to stipulate to enforcement of the
March 22, 2002 Order. See Addendum Exhibit "F"; see also Appellate Record, p. 502.
Appellant's counsel again appeared before the Court on Appellant's motion for
reconsideration, this time to argue that the March 22, 2002 Order should not have been
granted. See Addendum Exhibit "F"; see also Appellate Record, p. 539. This motion
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was denied. See Appellate Record, pp. 545-547. Appellant has received all the notice it
was entitled to.
For each of these reasons, Appellant's "notice" argument fails to show that there
was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
III.

APPELLANT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE.

Finally, as set forth in Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition, this appeal
should be dismissed on technical grounds, as Appellant has consistently failed to follow
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
As set forth above, this Court dismissed Appellant's appeal on August 23, 2002,
pursuant to Rule 37(b), Utah R. App. P. See Addendum Exhibit "B". Appellant's
counsel filed an "Amended Notice of Appeal" on August 19, 2002, but this was
insufficient to resurrect the appeal, as this Court dismissed said appeal some four days
later. Nevertheless, Appellant's counsel filed this same document, which was marked as
"Filed August 19, 2002" in the Third District Court, with this Court on August 28, 2002.
See Addendum Exhibit "E".
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure specifically provide for what to do if an
appeal is dismissed. Rule 23A, Utah R. App. P., states that, under certain circumstances,
one whose appeal has been dismissed may move the Court for reinstatement. This
presumes that one must wait for the Court's permission, via an order for instance, before
moving ahead with the same appeal. Appellant did not do this. Instead, counsel for
Appellant simply filed an "Amended Notice of Appeal" a second (indeed, a third) time.
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"We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal only if the [Appellants] filed a timely notice of
appeal." Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 44 P.3d 663 (Utah 2002), citing Gorostieta v.
Parkinson, 17 P.3d 1110, (Utah 2000); see also Reisbeck y. HCA Health Servs. of Utah,
Inc., 2 P.3d 447 (Utah 2000). Although this statement is typically made in relation to
Rule 4(a), Utah R. App. P., and the requirement that an appeal be brought within 30 days
of a final order or judgment, it would seem to haye equal application here. The interplay
between Rule 37(b) and Rule 23A would suggest that Appellant's latest appeal is
untimely - at least until she is granted permission to file a new appeal by this Court.
Even if its latest "Amended Notice of Appeal" was considered timely, Appellant
did not file a new docketing statement. Rule 9(a) requires that a docketing statement be
filed within twenty one days after the notice of appeal. Utah R. App. P. 9(a). This
requirement was not met by Appellant. The last "Amended Docketing Statement" filed
by Appellant was on August 22, 2002 - before this appeal was dismissed. See Exhibit
"D." Although Rule 9 non-compliance enforcement is discretionary, see Gorostieta v.
Parkinson, 17 P.3d at 1116 ("Docketing statements which fail to comply with this rule
will not be accepted. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of the appeal or the
petition"), citing Rule 9(g), courts have dismissed cases based on such non-compliance.
See Brooks v. Department of Employment Security, 736 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah App. 1987).
For each of these reasons, and the combination thereof, the decision of the trial
court should be affirmed and this appeal should be dismissed.

299:26551 lvl
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IV.

APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER COSTS AND FEES.

Appellee is entitled to recover its costs and attorneys' fees from Appellant because
this appeal is frivolous. Rule 33(a), Utah R. App. P., states that "if the court determines
that [an] appeal... is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which
may include single or double costs as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees,
to the prevailing party."1
Rule 33(b) defines a frivolous appeal as one "that is not grounded in fact, not
warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law." Further, Rule 33(b) defines an appeal filed for the purpose of
delay as one that is "interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause
needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party
filing the appeal...." Appellee submits that this appeal meets the definition of
"frivolous" as set forth above. Appellant has set forth no valid reason for making this
appeal, has not even attempted to meet its burden in regard to the standard of review for
this appeal, and has forced Appellee, who is simply a volunteer in this matter, to waste
countless hours addressing an issue which has fully and fairly been decided by the trial
court (on numerous occasions) in this matter. Rules 33 and 40 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure were adopted to address just this type of case.

1

See also Utah R. App. P. 40(a) which states that "[t]he signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the motion, brief, or other
paper; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
reasonable inquiry, it is not frivolous or interposed for the purpose of delay as defined in
Rule 33. . . . If a motion, brief, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
authority and the procedures of the court provided by Rule 33 shall apply."
299:26551 lvl
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the district court's denial of
appellant's motion for reconsideration, and this appeal should be dismissed. Appellee is
entitled to recover its costs and attorneys' fees incurred in this appeal.
This brief is respectfully submitted to this honorable Court.
DATED this <H) day of March, 2003.

Lbren Weiss
Bradley M. Strassberg
Attorneys for Appellee
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Addenda

(

ADDENDUM
Exhibit No.

Document

A

Withdrawal of Appeal and Request for Return of Appeal Bond,
dated August 16, 2002

1

B

Notice of Decision, dated August 23, 2002

1

C

Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and Reinstate Appeal and 1
Affidavit of Counsel, dated August 27, 2002

D

Amended Docketing Statement, filed August 22,2002

E

Amended Notice(s) of Appeal, filed August 19,2002, and August
28,2002

F

Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, dated April 5,2002

G

Order, dated December 20,2001

H

Order, dated March 22, 2002

1

EXHIBIT "A

ELIZABETH KNOWLTON »o893
Bannock County Public Defenders' Office
P.O. Box 4147
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4147
(208) 236-7040

FILED
UTAH SUPREME COURT

Attorney for The Felt Building

AUG 1 6 2002
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

PAT BARTHOLOMEW
CLERK OF THE COURT

WITHDRAWAL OF
APPEAL AND REQUEST FOR
RETURN OF APPEAL BOND

In the Matter of die
Discipline of:

Appeal No. 20020619
JOHN ALEX, 6696,
Hon. Judge William B. Bohling
Respondent.

COMES NOW Appellant The Felt Building, by and through their attorney, Elizabeth
Knowlton, and hereby withdraws their appeal of the June 17, 2002, order entered by the
Honorable Judge William B. Bohling, in the above-entitled matter and requests return of the
$300.00 appeal bond filed by Appellant The Felt Building.
DATED:

Respectfully aubmitteji:

Elizabeth Knowlton, Attorney
For The Felt Building
CERTIFICATE OFMAILING
I, Elizabeth Knowlton, hereby certify that on /jf /^i
, 2002, I mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing withdrawal of appeal addressed as follows:
Loren E. Weiss
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
>
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
(_ %
Elizabeth Knowlton

1

EXHIBIT "B

FILED
UTAH SUPREME COURT
...p « « «Q02

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

PAT BARTHOLOMEW
CLERK OF THE COURT
NOTICE OF DECISION

In the Matter of the Discipline
of John Alex, 6696.
The Felt Building,
Appellant,
v.

No. 20020619-SC
990909957

Utah State Bar,
Appellee.

The above-entitled case was submitted to the court for decision
and the attached order has been issued.
Order Issued:

August 23, 2002

Notice of Decision Issued: August 23, 2002
Record: None
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
990909957

GOTvfepife^
Deputy Clerk

FILED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH UTAH SUPREME COURT
00O00

AUG 2 3 2002
PAT BARTHOLOMEW
CLERK OF THE COURT

In the Matter of the Discipline
of John Alex, 6696.
The F e l t

Building,
Appellant,
No. 20020619-SC
990909957

v,

Utah S t a t e Bar,
Appellee.
ORDER

This matter is before the court upon appellant's voluntary
withdrawal of the appeal in the above-entitled matter, filed on
August 16, 2002.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Utah
Rules of Appellant Procedure the appeal in the above-entitled
matter is dismissed.
FURTHER the Supreme Court does not have
the authority to act upon the request for refund of the $300.00
bond, filed with the district court.

For the Court:

;23 <^e° 2Dat

Pat H. Bartholomew
Clerk of Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on August 23, 2002, true and correct copies
of the foregoing ORDER and NOTICE OF DECISION were deposited in
the United States mail to the party(ies) listed below:
ELIZABETH KNOWLTON
BANNOCK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE
P 0 BOX 4147
POCATELLO ID 83205-4147
LOREN E. WEISS
VANCOTT BAGLEY CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 S MAIL ST STE 1600
PO BOX 45340
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-0340
and true and correct copies of the foregoing ORDER and NOTICE OF
DECISION were placed in Interdepartmental Mail to be delivered to
the trial court listed below:
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: SUZY CARLSON
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 18 60
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860

BV JtlMy.

IAJMT

Depu£y Clerk
Case No.: 20020619-SC
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE , #990909957

EXHIBIT "C

FILED

ELIZABETH KNOWLTON #5893
Bannock County Public Defenders' Office
P.O. Box 4147
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4147
(208) 236-7040

UTAH SUPREME COURT

AUG 2 7 200Z
PAT BARTHOLOMEW
CLERK OF THE COURT

Attorney for The Felt Building

IN TBLE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
In the Matter of the

MOTION TO SET ASIDE ORDER OF
DISMISSAL AND REINSTATE APPEAL
AND AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL

Discipline of:
JOHN ALEX, 6696,

Appeal No.20020619
District Case No. 990909957

Respondent
Hon. Judge William B. Bohling
COMES NOW The Felt Building, appellant, by and through their attorney, Elizabeth
Knowlton, and hereby moves this Court to set aside their August 23, 2002, dismissal based on
appellant's voluntary withdrawal and reinstate appellant's appeal based on the following facts:
I, ELIZABETH KNOWLTON, hereby declare the following under penalty of perjury:
1 am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Utah, bar identification
number 5893. On August 14, 2002, I received a notice from the Utah Supreme Court, dated
August 13, 2002, informing me that my docketing statement was deficient because my original
notice of appeal was dated July 18, 2002, thirty-one days after a hearing held on June 17, 2002,
regarding appellant's timely motion for reconsideration of the March 227 2002, order entered by
the Honorable Judge William B. Bohling and denied by minute entry. On the same day, August
16, 2002, I mailed a request to withdraw appellant's appeal because I erronously assumed an
order denying my motion for reconsideration had been signed by Judge Bohling and entered on
June 17, 2002.
On August 16, 2002, 1 realized that the order regarding the June 17, 2002, hearing had

I

not yet been signed by Judge Bohling. On the same day, I drove to Salt Lake City, appeared in
the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's office and told the clerk that I did not want to file my request to
withdraw my appeal and, in the event my request had been filed, that I wanted to file /a
termination of my request to withdraw my appeal.
The clerk informed me that my request to withdraw the appeal had been received, but not yei
filed; so she returned my original request to withdraw my appeal to me.
On Monday morning, August 19, 2002, I met with opposing counsel, Loren Weiss,
obtained a copy of the order Mr. Weiss had prepared and informed Mr. Weiss that my client
would not withdraw his appeal. I obtained Judge Bohling's signature on the order denying
appellant's motion for reconsideration and filed an amended notice of appeal.
On August 20, 2002, I amended my docketing statement and mailed it to the Utah
Supreme Court. On August 27, 2002,1 received notice that my appeal had been dismissed based
on my request which I believed I had rescinded by physically retrieving the original request from
the Court on August 16, 2002.
I do not wish withdraw the appeal, and did everything I reasonably necessary to rescind
and terminate my hasty August 16, 2002, request I do not know how the Utah Supreme Court
obtained a second request to withdraw the appeal unless all the copies of documents and
transcript I mailed to my client on August 16, 2002, were mistakenly or inadvertently mailed or
delivered to the court without my knowledge.

Dated: ^27^2^

^ ,

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
Elizabeth Knowlton
Attorney for Appellant

2

Si ATE OF IDAHO

)
)ss:

COUNTY OF BANNOCK )
On August 27, 2002, before rae appeared Elizabeth Knowlton, who is known to me and
having been duly sworn, told me she execxrted the same on this date.

~ fjky&Ea^ptcfe

\^>

gP

expires: rf ^p/^

-&2*+

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

•v,f'''••"I"
OF IDElizabeth
V
Knowlton, hereby certify that on August""v^, 2002, I mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing motion addressed as follows:
Loren E. Weiss, Esq.
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
GREGORY SKORDAS
Attorney at Law
9 Exchange Place, Suite 810
SaltLakeCity,UT841U

Elizabeth Knowlton
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EXHIBIT "D

ELIZABETH KNOWLTO.. ^893
Bannock County Public Defenders' Office
P.O. Box 4147
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4147
(208)236-7040

ptl! f-fl
I yj^u ;; i )^ ^: COURT

Attorney for The Felt Building

Q -L\. r

V.
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"rW!* : V* , *»
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the
Discipline of:
JOHN ALEX, 6696,
Respondent.

)
)
)

AMENDED
DOCKETING STATEMENT
(Subject to Court of Appeals Assignment)
iA.prml Nn °nOfj1 n
d£>0±-O
District Case No. 990909957

)
)
)
)

7(J-7~*C—~

Hon. Judge William B. Bohling

COMES NOW The Felt Building, appellant, by and through their attorney, Elizabeth
Knowlton, and hereby files the foregoing Amended Docketing Statement:
(1) On June 17, 2002, appellant's timely motion for reconsideration of the March 22,
2002, order entered by the Honorable Judge William B. Bohling was heard by Judge Bohling and
denied by minute entry. On August 19, 2002, Judge Bohling signed and entered the order
denying appellant's motion for reconsideration. Attached hereto, designated Exhibit "A", and
incorporated by reference is a copy of the final order.
Other than appellant's motion for reconsideration of the March 22, 2002, order, no other
motions were filed under Rules 50(a), 50(b), 54(b) or 59, of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Appellant's Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on August 19, 2002, the date of signing and
entry of the order. Attached hereto, designated Exhibit "B", and incorporated by reference is a
copy of appellant's amended notice of appeal. The July 17, 2002, minutes of the hearing are
attached hereto, designated Exhibit "C" and incorporated by reference. A copy of the transcript of

1

the July 17, 2002, hearinfe ID attached to appellant's first docketing ou*^ment.
(2) This Court has jurisdiction under Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure and Section 78-2a-3 of the Utah Code (as amended.).
(3) This appeal is from the August 19, 2002, final order denying appellant's July 17,
2002, motion for reconsideration of the March 22, 2002, order, ordering appellant to give The
Utah State Bar Trustee, Loren Weiss, possession of all property in appellant's possession owned
by John Alex and left by John Alex on the premises owned by appellant.
(4) On December 5, 2002, appellant filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer on behalf of
The Felt Building against John Alex for unpaid rent accruing during the months of August
through December, 2001, Third District Court Case No. 010910966.

(Hearing Transcript,

hereinafter designated "HT", page 2.)
On December 21, 2001, the Honorable Judge William B. Bohling entered the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, & Order of Disbarment: (1): Appointing Loren Weiss, as
trustee, of John Alex's law practice, client files, any money held in Mr. Alex's trust account, and
any client or third party funds; and (2) Granting Loren Weiss, as trustee, all powers enumberated
in Rule 27 RLDD, and other powers necessary to fulfill obligations of trustee, including
possession of all trust funds, client & third party funds for purpose of returning funds and
possession of all client files at office or residence. (HT, pages 2-3.)
On February 12, 2002, appellant obtained a judgment against John Alex for breach of the
parties' lease agreement, for restitution of the office premises owned by appellant and occupied
by John Alex under the parties' lease agreement, forfeiture of parties' lease, $1,424.50 unpaid
rent monthly, and treble rent. (HT, pages 2.)
On March 20, 2002, appellant's agent met with Mr. Weiss' paralegal, WILLIAM
2

CRAWLEY, allowed h^n to remove client files and document uom Mr. Alex' law office
located on the premises owned by appellant. (HT, pages 3-4, 7.)
On March 22, 2002, Mr. Weiss obtained an order from Judge Bohling allowing him:
"...complete authority to recover, attach, remove and possess any and all property, including but
limited to all files, records, electronic data, computers, furnishings, office equipment and
machines, telephones, chairs, refrigerators at the former law office and residence of the
respondent, John Alex."

(HT, page 5.)

Appellant was not served with a copy of the March 22, 2002, order nor given any notice
of the order either on March 22, 2002, or any subsequent date prior to March 29, 2002.
On March 29, appellant was served with an order to show cause for Contempt charging a
violation of the March 22, 2002, order, scheduled for hearing on April 1, 2002. On April 1,
2002, the Utah State Bar Trustee agreed to dismiss the contempt charges against appellant in
return for possession of all the property owned by John Alex in appellant's possession. (HT,
pages 6-8.) Shortly thereafter, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 22, 2002,
order.
(5) The issues presented on appeal are: (1) As a lessor in possession of property
abandoned on the lessor's premises by lessee, and as judgment creditor, appellant had lawful
possession of the property owned by John Alex; (2)

As a lessor in possession property

abandoned on the lessor's premises, and as judgment creditor, appellant had an ownership
interest in the property and the right to sell property abandoned by John Alex; (4) Rule 27 of the
Utah Code of Lawyer Discipline & Disability does not authorize the district court to award to
The Utah State Bar Trustee possession of all property owned by disciplined lawyer and in lawful
possession of that lawyer's judgment creditor; (5) the March 22, 2002, order is an
3

unconstitutional taking Oi pioperty and was obtained in violation Oi uue process.
A trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed on appeal for correctness and factual issues
not overturned absent clear error.( State v. Navanick, 1999 UT App. 265, p.7, 987 P.2d 1276;/
State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 1996). A challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute is also a question of law and reviewed for correctness. (State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73,
p.6, 31 P.3d 547, citing State v. Lopes. 1999 UT 24, p.6, 980 P.2d 191.)
(6) Subject to assignment to the Court of Appeals.
(7) No prior appeals have been filed, .
Dated:

Respectfully filed,

Elizabeth Knowlton
Attorney for Appellant
The Felt Building

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Elizabeth Knowlton, hereby certify that on August-^<s, 2002, I mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing notice of appeal addressed as follows:
Loren E. Weiss, Esq.
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
GREGORY SKORDAS
Attorney at Law
9 Exchange Place, Suite 810
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Elizabeth Knowlton
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EXHIBIT "E

ELIZABETH KNOWLTuN #5893
Bannock County Public Defenders'Office
P.O. BOX 4147
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4147
(208)236-7040

,":•; # 7

pnirr:

02 AUG 13 ?U \- !S

Attorney for The Felt Building

i «.:*', i

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the

AMENDED
NOTICE OF APPEAL

Discipline of:
Case No. 990909957
JOHN ALEX, 6696,
Hon. Judge William B. Bohling
Respondent.

COMFS NOW The Felt Building, appellant, by and through their attorney, Elizabeth
Knowlton. and hereby appeals the March 22, 2002, order heard on June 17, 2002, executed and
entered by the Honorable Judge William B. Bohling. on Augustl9, 2002, denying appellant's
motion for reconsideration of the March 22, 2002. order ordering appellant to give the Utah State
Bar Trustee, appellee. Loren Weiss, possession of all John Alex's office equipment and personal
property in appellant's possession left by John Alex on premises owned by appellant.
DATED: O

/ /

^ ^

Respectfully submitted:

Eliz^rneth Knowlton. Attorney
For The Felt Building

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I. Lli/.abclh Knowllon. hereby certify thai on August l(). 2002. I mailed a true and correct
cop\ oflhc lorcyoiiiLi amended noliee ofappeal addressed as follows:
l.orcn I•'. Weiss
VANCOTT. IV'\(il.l-Y. CORNWALL & McCAk'IIIY

50 South Main Street. Suite I 700
Salt Lake Cilv. I IT 84145

FILED

ELIZABETH KNOWLTON #5893

d t a h C o u n of

Bannock County Public Defenders' Office

P.O. Box 4147
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4147

^^^

AUW3 2Q02

(208) 236-7040

Pautette Stagg
Clerk cQhe Court

Attorney for The Felt Building

t\ £
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT"
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IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 5 'J.
50 vo
In the Matter of the

AMENDED
NOTICE OF APPEAL
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Discipline of:
Case No. 990909957
JOHN ALEX, 6696,
Hon. Judge William B. Bohling
Respondent.

COMES NOW The Felt Building, appellant, by and through their attorney, Elizabeth
Knowlton, and hereby appeals the March 22, 2002, order heard on June 17, 2002, executed and
entered by the Honorable Judge William B. Bohling, on August 19, 2002, denying appellant's
motion for reconsideration of the March 22, 2002, order ordering appellant to give the Utah State
Bar Trustee, appellee, Loren Weiss, possession o f all John Alex's office equipment and personal
property in appellant's possession left by John Alex on premises owned by appellant.
DATED: S^/J

^ ^

Respectfully submitted:

m*

=?

Elizaoeth Knowlton, Attorney
For The Felt Building

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Elizabeth Knowlton, hereby certify that on August 19, 2002,1 mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing amended notice of appeal addressed as follows:
Loren E. Weiss
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
^ - ^ ^
lowlton
Elizabe

%
ICFRT!FYTHATTH1$ISA
ORIGINAL DOCUkT "
DISTRICT COURT.

OFUTAH
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DATE
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EXHIBIT "F

ELIZABETH KNOWLTON #5893
Attorney for The Felt Building
414 Skull Valley Road
Grantsville, UT 84029
(801) 745-0423
THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNT/SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
In the matter of the
Discipline of:
John Alex, 6696

)
)
)
)

MOTION FOR RECONSDDERATION
MODIFY OR SET ASD3E ORDER,
MOTION TO INTERVENE, POINTS
AND AUTHORTITES, AND AFFIDAVIT

)

OF COUNSEL
Case No. 990909957
Judge William B. Bohling

COMES NOW THE FELT BUILDING, defendant in the Order to Show Cause, issued by
this Court on March 28, 2002, and plaintiff in The Felt Building v. John Alex, Case No.
010910966, filed December 5, 2001, in the Third District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, by
and through its attorney, ELIZABETH KNOWLTON, and pursuant to Sections 78-36-10.5,
subsections (3) and (5), of the Utah Code (as annotated), Rules 24 and 60 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, hereby moves this Court to reconsider and/or modify its order dated March 22,
2002, on the grounds that The Felt Building, having obtained a writ of restitution and money
judgment against John Alex on February 12, 2002, had priority of ownership of the personal
property left by John Alex, excluding client files and funds, on The Felt Building's premises.
Under Section 78-36-10.5 (5) and Rule 24, The Felt Buliding claims a right to intervene herein.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On December 5, 2001, The Felt Building, owner of the premises leased by John Alex, filed
1

a complaint for unpaid rent due under the parties' lease agreement, The Felt Building v. John
Alex. Case No. 010910966, Third District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake
Department.
On February 12,2002, The Felt Building obtained a default judgment against John Alex,
attached hereto, designated Exhibit "A" is a copy of the default judgment. On the same date, The
Felt Building also obtained a restitution order. Attached hereto, designated Exhibit "B" is a copy
of the restitution order.
On March 22, 2002, this Court issued an order clarifying its December 20, 2001, order
regarding possession by the trustee, Loren Weiss, of thefilesand client funds left on the premises
owned by The Felt Building. The March 22, 2002, order granted the trustee all remaining
personal property left on the premises, including furnishings, office equipment and machines,
telephones, chairs, refrigerators and property at the residence of John Alex.. Attached hereto,
designated Exhibit "C" is a copy of the March 22, 2002, order.
On Friday, March 29, 2002, The Felt Building and its agent, Patrick Knowlton, were
served a copy of the March 22, 2002, order and an order to show cause for contempt, scheduled
for hearing scheduled for hearing on the following Monday, April 1, 2002. No other notice of the
March 22, 2002 order was received by The Felt Building or its attorney, Elizabeth Knowlton prior
to March 29, 2002. On April 1, 2002, under threat of a finding of contempt of court, The Felt
Building stipulated that the trustee, Loren Weiss could take possession of the property described
in the March 22, 2002, order.
The March 22, 2002, order mailed by the Trustee to counsel, was not mailed to Elizabeth
Knowlton's correct address, but to the address of John Alex (Exhibit "D", attached hereto).
2

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I
UNDER SECTION 78-36-10.5, THE FELT
BUILDING HAS THE RIGHT TO POSSESSION
AND A HEARING TO DETERMINE OWNERSHIP
OF PROPERTY LEFT ON ITS PREMISES
Subsection (3)(b), of Section 78-36-10.5 of the Utah Code (as annotated), provides as
follows: "Any personal property of the defendant may be removed from the premises by the
sheriff or constable and transported to a suitable location for storage. The sheriff or constable,
with the plaintifFs consent, may delegate responsibility for storage to the plaintiflf, who must store
the personal property in a suitable place and in a reasonable manner.
Subsection (5) of Section 78-36-10.5 of the Utah Code (as annotated), provides as
follows: "In the event of a dispute concerning the terms of the order of restitution or the manner
of its enforcement, the defendant or any person claiming to own stored personal property may file
a request for a hearing. The court shall set the matter for hearing within ten daysfromthe filing of
the request or as soon thereafter as practiable, and shall mail notice of the hearing to the parties."
The Felt Building claims ownership under its default judgment, restitution order issued
February 12, 2002, and subsequent writ of execution. Section 78-36-10.5, (3)(b), authorizes their
possession of John Alex's personal property, excluding clientfilesand client funds, located on the
premises owned by The Felt Building. Section 78-36-5 authorizes a hearing on the issue.

n
UNDER SECTION 78-36-12.6, THE FELT BUILDING
IS ENTITLED TO EXUCUTE THEIR JUDGMENT AND
SALE PROPERTY ABANDONED ON THE PREMISES
Section 78-36-12.6, subsection (2), of the Utah Code (as annoted), provides as follows:

3

"If a tenant has abandoned the premises and left personal property on the premises, the owner is
entitled to remove the property from the dwelling, store it for the tenant and recover actual
moving and storage costs. The owner shall make reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of the
location of the personal property; however, if the property has been in storage for over 30 days
and the tenant has made no reasonable effort to recover it, the owner may sell the property and
apply the proceeds toward any amount the tenant owes..."
Despite reasonable efforts, The Felt Building cannot locate John Alex, who has not paid
the rent due and has not been seen on the premises for many months. The personal property
owned by John Alex has been in storage with The Felt Building for over 30 days; therefore, since
John Alex has abandoned the premises, as owner of the premises, The Felt Building is entitled to
possession of all property, excluding client filed and client funds, to execute upon and sell the
property, apply the proceeds toward the judgment amount owed by John Alex.
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceduar, subsection (b), provides that: "On motion,
and upon such terms as may be just, the court may in furtherance ofjustice, relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order or legal proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertance, suprize or excusable neglect..." In this case, counsel for the Felt Building
was mailed notice of the March 22, 2002, order at an incorrect address, the address of John Alex,
and did not receive written notice of the order until April 1, 2002, the date of the contempt
hearing.
On April 1, 2002, counsel stipulated to possession of the property owned by John Alex
and left on the premises of The Felt Building under threat of contempt. Due to insufficient notice
of the March 22, 2002, order, mistake, inadvertance and suprise, the order should be set aside.
4

in
THE ORDER SHOULD BE SET ASIDE
BECAUSE IT WAS OBTAINED WITHOUT
PRIOR NOTICE DEPRIVES CLAIMANT OF
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS
According to the Certificate of Servicefiledwith the March 22, 2002, order, neither
counsel for The Felt Building nor John Alex's counsel were mailed notice of the order until after
March 22, 2002. There are no pleadings in the record or reasons given to substantiate the
trustee's claim for all the personal property, other than clientfilesand client funds, located in the
office and residence of John Alex.
Other than possession of client files and client funds, the trustee appointed in the State
Bar Disciplinary proceedings does nof%ny ownership interest in the property of John Alex
superior to The Felt Building's claim. Other than a proceeding threatening immediate contempt if
The Felt Building did not surrender the property, counsel has not been given an opportunity to
appear and challange the March 22,2002, order. The order should be set aside because it was
obtained in violation of the Utah and United States Constitutions which require due process of
law before depriving an individual/entity of its property or vested property interests.
MOTION TO INTERVENE
Rule 24, subsection (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that upon timely
application, anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers an
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when an application claims an interest relating to the
property which is subject to the action. The Felt Building, as lessor and owner of the office
premises leased by John Alex, has both a statutory right to a hearing under 78-36-10.5(5) and a
statutory right under Rule 69 to execute its February 12, 2002, judgment against the property of
5

John Alex. Moreover, this court exercised jurisdiction on April 1, 2002, by bringing an action for
contempt against The Felt Building for failure to comply with the March 22, 2002, order.
DATED: */' 5 " " ^

Respectfully submitted,
Elizabeth Knowlton

AFFIDAVIT OF ELIZABETH KNOWLTON
I, ELIZABETH KNOWLTON, hereby declare under penalty of perjury as follows:
I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. I am the attorney of
record forThe Felt Building. On December 5, 2001, The Felt Building, owner of the premises,
filed a complaint for rent due under the parties' lease agreement, The Felt Building v. John Alex.
Case No. 010910966, Third District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department.
On February 12, 2002, The Felt Building obtained the default judgment/restitution order
designated Exhibit "A" and "B"herein. On March 22, 2002, without prior notice to me, this Court
issued an order regarding possession of property left on premises owned by The Felt Building.
On Friday, March 29,2002, The Felt Building and its agent, Patrick Knowlton, were
served a copy of the March 22, 2002, order and an order to show cause for contempt, scheduled
for hearing the following Monday, April 1, 2002. No other notice of the March 22, 2002 order
was received by me prior to March 29, 2002. On April 1, 2002, before the contempt hearing, I
reviewed the March 22, 2002 order in the court file and obtained a copy from my client. I had not
seen the March 22, 2002, order prior to April 1, 2002. The order was not mailed to my address.
On April 1, 2002,1 stipulated that to possession of the property because the March 22,
2002, order has not been set aside and because my clients were with contempt if they refused.

/c/
Elizabeth Knowlton
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STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY

)
)ss:
)

On April
, 2002, before me appeared Elizabeth Knowlton, who being duly sworn did
declare to me that she executed the foregoing affidavit.

Notary Public
My commission expires:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Elizabeth Knowlton, hereby certify that on April J> , 2002,1 mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing request for hearing, motion for reconsideration and/or set aside
order, postage fully prepaid, to the following:
Loren E. Weiss, Esq.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Gregory G. Skordas, Esq.
9 Exchange Place, Suite 810
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Elizabeth Knowlton
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EXHIBIT "G

Charles A. Gruber, #7391
Assistant Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct
UTAH STATE BAR
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)531-9110

aufy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

John Alex, #6696
Respondent

)
)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER RE DISBARMENT
[STAYED] AND TRUSTEE

)
)

CIVIL NO. 990909957
JUDGE: William B. Bohling

On November 26, 2001, this Court held a review hearing regarding the Court's
Order lifting the Respondent, John Alex's stayed suspension and suspending him from
the practice of law for six months. The Court made that ruling on October 19, 2001.
Charles A. Gruber was present and represented the Utah State Bar Office of
Professional Conduct. Gregory Skordas, was present and represented Mr. Alex. Mr.
Alex was not present.
The Court, having considered the report, recommendations and arguments of
counsel and otherwise being fully advised in the premises makes the following findings,
conclusions, and orders:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On February 27, 2001, this Court signed and entered its Order of
Suspension in this matter suspending Mr. Alex for six months and placing
him on eighteen months of probation thereafter.
suspension were stayed.

The six months of

Among other things, the Court's order also

ordered Mr. Alex to be supervised by a supervising attorney, respond to
any outstanding informal complaints against Mr. Alex, submit to binding
fee arbitration if requested by clients, and attend the OPC's ethics school,
2.

On June 15, 2001 this Court held a hearing on its order to show cause
why Mr. Alex should not be held in contempt for violating the Court's Order
of Suspension and Probation. Following that hearing, the Court signed
and entered a further Order ordering Mr. Alex to meet with the Court
appointed supervising attorney Mr. Frank Carney and reply to the OPC to
all outstanding informal complaints within 72 hours.

The Court also

ordered a review hearing on July 20, 2001.
3.

On July 20, 2001 a review hearing was held. On that day, Mr. Alex tardily
hand delivered responses to informal complaints that were due within 72
hours of the hearing on June 15, 2001 to the OPC.

4.

On July 20, 2001, the Court set a review hearing on October 19, 2001.

5.

On October 19, 2001, the Court heard and received testimony and other
evidence regarding Mr. John Alex as it relates to the Court's orders
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concerning Mr. Alex. Charles A. Gruber was present and represented the
Utah State Bar Office of Professional Conduct. Gregory Skordas, was
present and represented Mr. Alex.

Frank Carney, court appointed

supervising attorney was also present and testified. Mr. John Alex was
not present.

At that hearing the Court made certain findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and orders.
6.

In its ruling on October 19, 2001, the Court ordered that Mr. Alex was to
comply with Rule 26 Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD") by
November 19, 2001.

7.

In its ruling on October 19, 2001, the Court gave notice to Mr. Alex that if
he did not comply with Rule 26 RLDD by November 19, 2001, this Court
would consider pursuant to Rule 26(e) RLDD holding Mr. Alex in contempt
and assessing further attorney discipline.

8.

As of November 26, 2001, it appears that Mr. Alex has not complied with
each requirement of Rule 26 (b) RLDD.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In failing to comply with Rule 26(b) RLDD, Mr. Alex has violated this
Court's Order of October 19, 2001, which required him to comply with
Rule 26(b) RLDD.
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2.

Pursuant to Rule 26(e) RLDD, this Court finds that further discipline
pursuant to Rule 26(e) is appropriate for failing to comply with Rule 26(b)
RLDD.

3.

Pursuant to Rule 5.2 Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, this Court
orders that further discipline is warranted for violating this Court's previous
order of discipline suspending Mr. Alex for six months form the practice of
law and ordering him to comply with Rule 26(b) RLDD.

4.

This Court further finds that a trustee in this matter is appropriate and
necessary because it appears Mr. Alex has not complied with Rule 26(b)
RLDD, including, but not limited to, returning client files and unearned fees
and client or third party funds held by Mr. Alex.

ORDER OF DISBARMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent, John Alex, is hereby disbarred
from the practice of law.

That disbarment is stayed pending a review hearing on

January 10, 2001 at 9:00 a.m. At that review hearing on January 10, 2001, Mr. Alex
should show good cause why the stay of his disbarment should not be lifted and why he
should not be disbarred. Mr. Alex is currently suspended from the practice of law for six
months with a beginning date of his suspension being October 19, 2001.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that if Mr. Alex does not show good cause
why the stay of his disbarment should not be lifted then the stay of his disbarment shall
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be lifted and he will be disbarred form the practice of law as of November 26, 2001.
Thereafter, he must comply with all requirements of Rule 25 RLDD and any other Rules
of Admission when seeking readmission from his disbarment.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Loren E. Weiss is appointed trustee of Mr.
Alex's law practice, of the client files, and any money held in Mr. Alex's trust account
and any client or third party funds held in any account.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Weiss, as trustee, shall have all powers
enumerated in Rule 27 RLDD and any and other powers reasonably necessary to fulfill
the obligations of the trustee including but not limited to taking possession of all funds in
any trust account held by Mr. Alex and any client or third party funds in any other
account for the purpose of returning all client and third party funds to those persons;
returning unearned fees; and taking possession of all client files at any location
including Mr. Alex's law office or place of residence or any other place for the purpose
of returning those files to the clients. Previously, on October 19, 2001, this Court
ordered that pursuant to Rule 27 RLDD a trustee was appointed by the Court with all
powers outlined in Rule 27 RLDD and any and other power reasonably necessary to
fulfill the obligations of the trustee under Rule 27 RLDD. Previously, on October 19,
2001, this Court ordered that all costs and attorney fees of the trustee shall be paid by
Mr. Alex. All fees and costs are to be presented to the Court by the trustee for the
Court's review and approval.
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IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that a review hearing will be held on
January 10, 2002 at 9:00 a.m. for the purposes of reviewing whether or not Mr. Alex can
show good cause why this court should lift the stay of Mr. Alex's disbarment.
lis
DATED this

.,2001.

day

BY THE COURT:

William B. Bohling
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

'.f:'..Tv'tlJlzi
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- ; - - ; o J t Lake County, State of Utah, as o
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uato:

Daputy Cofo Clerk 7l

Gregory G.pkordas, Esq.
Attorney forlRespondent John Alex
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EXHIBIT "H

FMJB DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
Loren E. Weiss [A3969]
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY, P.C.
Trustee of John Alex Law Practice
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Post Office Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0340
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
Facsimile: (801)534-0058

MAR 2 2 2002
SALT LAKE COUNTY

\JLfr

Daputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the
Discipline of:

ORDER

John Alex, 6696,

Civil No.: 990909957
Respondent
Hon. Judge William B. Bohling

Having come before this Court, and for good cause shown by the Trustee, Loren E.
Weiss, for reasons of clarification of this court's prior order,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: that the Trustee, Mr. Loren Weiss, his agents and employees
have full and complete authority to recover, attach, remove and possess any and all property,
including but not limited to all files, records, electronic data, computers, furnishings, office
equipment and machines, telephones, chairs, refrigerators at the former law office(s) and
residence(s) of the respondent, John Alex.
DATED this # ^ f l a y of March, 2002.
609:244656V!

?

BY THE COURT

District Court Judge
i certify that this Is a true copy of the docket
text in this case on file in the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, as of
this date.
Date:_
3 . - 3 - * - ^ * ^
Deputy Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to be mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Gregory G. Skordas, Esq.
9 Exchange Place #810
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111;
Elizabeth A. Knowlton, Esq.
341 South Main Street #401
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Billy Lee Walker
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
'day of March, 2002.

land Delivery to Patrick Knowlton, Agent for Felt Building, L.L.C. on the 22nd day of
March, 2002v

609:244ft56 v I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two (2) true and correct copies of the within
and foregoing APPELLEE'S BRIEF to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 31 day
of March, 2003, to the following counsel of record:
Elizabeth Knowlton
427 27th Street
Ogden,Utah 84401

299:26551 lvl

